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COMMENTS
TAKING BACK MIRANDA: HOW SEIBERT AND
PATANE CAN KEEP "QUESTION-FIRST" AND
"OUTSIDE MIRANDA" INTERROGATION TACTICS
IN CHECK
Paul G. Alvarez'
"While to the undiscerning eye interrogation seems to be a
conversation, in fact it is a carefully orchestrated interaction which
provides an ideal forum for suspect manipulation."1
Aside from the right to freedom of speech,2 perhaps the most widely-
recognized rights afforded to citizens in this country are those articulated
in the landmark decision Miranda v. Arizona.3 At its most basic level,
the Miranda Court held that police officers are required to inform a
suspect of certain rights before any custodial interrogation begins.4
Failure to effectively warn the suspect of these rights will generally bar
the admission of any statements obtained during the interrogation for
purposes of guilt.5
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law. The author would like to thank his loving wife, Sarah, his parents and his
family for all their love, understanding, and unwavering support. The author would also
like to thank Professor Peter B. Rutledge for his wisdom, generosity, and guidance and
Professor Charles D. Weisselberg for providing insightful background information. And
Phil.
1. John T. Philipsborn, Interrogation Tactics in the Post-Dickerson Era, CHAMPION,
Jan./Feb. 2001, at 18, 76.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech .... ").
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Much of this recognition can undoubtedly be attributed to
the abundance of "cop dramas" (and, even now, reality shows, such as "Cops") on
television. See Cathy Young, Miranda Morass, REASON, Apr. 2000, at 54, 54, available at
http://reason.com/0004/fe.cy.miranda.shtml.
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. Though the Miranda warnings exist in several
forms, ranging from long-winded to terse, each version, regardless of its length, must have
certain key elements as prescribed by Miranda: the suspect has the right to remain silent,
the right to an attorney (appointed or retained), and that anything the suspect says may be
used as evidence against him. See id. at 444; see also Steve Mount, The Miranda Warning,
USCONSTITUTION.NET, at http://www.usconstitution.net/miranda.html (last modified June
13, 2005).
5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
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Rooted in the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination,6
Miranda's holding was largely a response to the growing prevalence of
abusive police interrogation tactics and the "inherently compelling
pressures" that such stationhouse practices place upon an "individual's
will to resist and [which might] compel him to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely."'  In reaching its decision, the Miranda Court
sought to provide a bright-line standard that would both protect the
rights of the suspect in custody and give guidance to the police and courts
in obtaining and ruling on the admissibility of evidence." However, later
decisions undercut Miranda's aspirations.' Though it has made recent
• • 10
attempts to clarify its Miranda jurisprudence, the Court now appears
more splintered on this issue than ever before.11
Equally disturbing is the effect this lack of jurisprudential direction hasS 12
had on a more practical front: law enforcement interrogation practices.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."). While it is true that the Miranda warnings are also
founded upon the Sixth Amendment right to have assistance of counsel in a criminal
proceeding, id. amend. VI, any issues with regard to the right of counsel are beyond the
scope of this Comment. Suffice to say, the right of a suspect to have counsel present in a
criminal proceeding and custodial interrogation is not questioned here, and is considered a
"given" for the purposes of this Comment's analysis.
7. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447-48, 467.
8. Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 113 (1998).
Indeed, Miranda's holding was seen by its principal authors to be a minimum standard
required by the Constitution, out of which fairer law enforcement practices would evolve.
Id. at 123-25.
9. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (holding that
testimonial evidence obtained without Miranda warnings is admissible for purposes of
impeachment); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (explaining that Miranda
warnings are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected");
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 714-15, 722 (1975) (extending the Harris exception to apply
when the suspect has been notified of and accepts his Miranda rights, then requests a
lawyer, but subsequently provides inculpatory information before the lawyer arrives); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1984) (reaffirming and extending Tucker's holding
by classifying the Miranda rules as merely "prophylactic"); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
317-18 (1985) (holding that a good faith failure by a police officer to administer Miranda
warnings to a suspect does not preclude admission of later-obtained inculpatory
information from a second interview in which the suspect was properly advised of his
rights).
10. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437-38, 444 (2000) (reaffirming
Miranda as "a constitutional decision," and overturning Congressional statute 18 U.S.C. §
3501 on grounds that Congress does not have the right to supersede the Court's decisions
that interpret and apply the Constitution).
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See, e.g., Charles L. Weisselberg, In the Siationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1121, 1121-22 (2001); Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 132.
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Specifically, the "one-two punch" of Harris v. New York 3 and Oregon v.
Hass,14 combined with the Court's holdings in Michigan v. Tucker,5 New
York v. Quarles, 6 and Oregon v. Elstad,17 has paved the way for
interrogation practices in which police officers make attempts to obtain
confessions by deliberately disregarding the warnings prescribed in
Miranda." While the Court has considered cases that have dealt
peripherally with "outside Miranda" issues, 9 its decisions have failed to
address whether information obtained by a police officer's deliberate
20
violation of Miranda is admissible for impeachment purposes.
Given the Court's uncertain direction in its recent Miranda
jurisprudence and the continued prevalence of "outside Miranda"
questioning, the issue of admissibility of evidence obtained by deliberate
Miranda violations will not be easily resolved." However, the Court is
not without a guiding light 2  The Supreme Court's recent decisions in
13. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
14. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
15. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
16. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
17. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
18. Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 133-37; see also Philipsborn, supra note 1, at 20. The
two most prevalent violations of Miranda are the "outside Miranda" and "question-first"
techniques. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608-09 & 2609 n.2 (2004) (plurality
opinion); Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 133 37; see also Philipsborn, supra note 1, at 20. As
discussed by Professor Charles L. Weisselberg, "outside Miranda" questioning involves
the police practice of giving the suspect his Miranda warnings and then deliberately
refusing to respect the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights once the warnings are given.
Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 133-37. "Question-first" covers situations where police
officers deliberately withhold giving Miranda warnings in an effort to obtain a confession;
Miranda warnings are generally given to the suspect only after a confession is obtained.
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2608-09 & 2609 n.2 (plurality opinion). Though slightly different in
technique, "outside Miranda" and "question-first" will be used interchangeably for the
purposes of this Comment because each constitutes a deliberate police practice designed
to circumvent or disregard Miranda. See id. at 2609 n.2 (plurality opinion) (recognizing
that both "outside Miranda" and "question-first" are similar deliberate police
interrogation practices that rely on the impeachment exception to Miranda created in
Harris as a justification for deliberately disregarding Miranda during interrogation).
19. See, e.g., Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605 (denying admission of pre- and post-Miranda
warning confessional statements when the warning is given near enough in time to an
initial confession that it would fail to adequately inform the suspect of the substance of her
Miranda rights); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309 (admitting inculpatory information obtained after
a police officer's initial "simple failure to administer the [Miranda] warnings,
unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the
suspect's ability to exercise his free will"); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 396-402 (1978)
(holding that inculpatory evidence is inadmissible for any purpose in a criminal trial if
deemed involuntary as a result of police misconduct).
20. See discussion infra Part I.
21. See discussion infra Part I.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
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Missouri v. Seibert2 3 and United States v. Patane2 4 provide an ideal model
for solving this problem.
This Comment will examine the historical underpinnings of the
constitutional protection against self-incrimination as it has evolved
through case law, and culminated in Miranda. It will then chronicle the
various cases following Miranda that have sought to clarify its holding,
from the Court's first exception to the rule, through the Court's most
recent decisions. Next, this Comment will demonstrate how the Court's
holdings in many of these cases have called into question the
constitutional underpinnings of the Miranda requirements, and how this
has ultimately created a loophole that allows police officers to engage in
the startling practice of questioning "outside Miranda" in order to obtain
confessional statements from suspects for impeachment purposes at trial.
In addition to addressing the growing prevalence of questioning
"outside Miranda," this Comment seeks to determine whether
confessions obtained by deliberate violations of Miranda may be used
against a suspect at trial for impeachment purposes,25 or whether the use
of such statements violates a suspect's constitutional protection against
self-incrimination. The Comment argues that, in light of the Court's
jurisprudence, all statements obtained "outside Miranda" are
inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment. Finally, this
Comment proposes a solution that ensures that a suspect's constitutional
rights will be protected during interrogation, while maintaining that
justice be served.
I. EVOLUTION OF A CASE, CONSTITUTIONALLY ROOTED
A. Digging in the Dirt. Uncovering Miranda's Roots
Though it is typically considered a constitutional issue," the privilege
against self-incrimination predates the enactment of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights. 7  Though the Court initially used the Fifth
23. 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
24. 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
25. This, of course, presumes that such a confession could only be used against the
defendant if she has decided to take the stand in her own defense. However, as this
Comment hopes to elucidate, the act of holding the defendant to a statement made while
in custody, but without being given her Miranda warnings, substantially diminishes the
defendant's rights to mount a complete defense as provided by the Constitution. See
discussion infra Parts II, III.
26. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
27. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 n.27 (1966) (observing the existence of
the right against self-incrimination as far back as Biblical times). The majority opinion in
Miranda goes on to point out that this right ultimately gained popularity during the early
1600s when John Lilburn, an anti-Stuart, refused to take the Star Chamber Oath, which
1198 [Vol. 54:1195
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• 28Amendment to govern cases involving police interrogation practices, in
Brown v. Mississippi,2 9 the Court began to apply a test rooted in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to these cases.3 Under
this test, a court looks at the totality of the circumstances surrounding an
interrogation, including the suspect's physical and mental condition, to
determine whether or not a confession was made voluntarily."
While the Due Process voluntariness test controlled self-incrimination
32
cases for nearly thirty years, some of the Justices became increasingly
disenchanted with the effectiveness of the test in deterring abusive policepracice durng usto ial " • 33
practices during custodial interrogation. Their disillusionment with the
Due Process voluntariness test is evidenced by their various attempts at
quietly circumventing the test through case law.34 Beginning in 1964,
would have forced Lilburn to answer all questions asked of him on any subject,
presumably including questions regarding his guilt. Id. at 458-59. Parliament's later
abolition of the Star Chamber and its oath reflected a sea change in the attitude toward
individual liberty in England that eventually found its way to the colonies in America. Id.
at 459. The colonists' embrace of this ideal naturally paved the way for the protection
against self-incrimination to find its way into the Fifth Amendment. [d.
28. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). In Brain, the defendant was
arrested for allegedly murdering three boat passengers at sea. Id. at 535-37. While in
custody, Bram was taken into a police detective's office, stripped of his clothing and
interrogated while both his clothing and his person were being searched. Id. at 538.
During this custodial interrogation, Bram made an inculpatory statement to the detective,
which was used against him at trial by the prosecution. Id. at 538-39. In overturning
Brain's conviction, the Court held that the admission of an involuntary confession is a
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at
542-43 (holding that, in light of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
a suspect's confession "'must be free and voluntary: that is, [it] must not be extracted by
any sort of threats or violence.., nor by the exertion of any improper influence"'(quoting
3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed. n.d.))).
29. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
30. Id. at 286-87 (holding that a violation of a suspect's Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process rights occurred when the trial court admitted into evidence a confession that had
been obtained through torture and coercion by police officers). This test will hereinafter
be referred to as the "Due Process voluntariness test."
31. Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 113-14. As the Court has consistently held,
statements considered to have been given involuntarily under the Due Process
voluntariness test were deemed inadmissible at trial for any purpose. Id.
32. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15 (1963); Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156, 186 (1953); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154-55 (1944); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1940).
33. Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old
Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 754-55 (1987).
34. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-27 (1959) (continuing to apply the
Due Process voluntariness test to post-indictment interrogation, but demonstrating that
four concurring Justices viewed the test as a corollary to the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 452-55 (1957) (holding, together with
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943), that a suspect's confession is
inadmissible if the suspect is not presented before a magistrate without delay). It is
2005] 1199
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however, the Court began a more open retreat away from the Due
Process voluntariness test, toward decisions that relied upon rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.35
B. Miranda: A Lasting Stitch in the Fabric of the Law
Three cases, Malloy,36 Escobedo,37 and Massiah,3 set the stage for
Miranda.39 As stated in Miranda, the Court's goal was ultimately to
achieve a harmonious balance between an individual's rights and
protections under the Constitution and the government's ability to
effectively prosecute an individual who is guilty of committing a crime.
40
In addition, the Court wanted to create a rule that would guide the police
and courts ably in matters of admissibility of evidence in ways it felt the
Due Process voluntariness test could not.
41
Building upon this, the Miranda Court announced a new test rooted in
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination that governed
the admissibility of statements acquired during custodial interrogations.
important to note that the McNabb-Mallory rule was an evidentiary exclusion rule not
grounded in the Constitution, and therefore not applicable to the states. JOSHUA
DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES
AND PERSPECTIVES (2d ed. 2003), reprinted in JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C.
THOMAS Ill, CRIMINAl PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATING CRIME 559 (2003).
35. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 484-85, 490-91 (1964) (expanding the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel during post-indictment interrogation recognized in
Spano to include pre-indictment interrogation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)
(reversing a denial of a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a suspect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-07 (1964) (relying on the Court's rationale in Spano to
incorporate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the states via the
Sixth Amendment).
36. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
37. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
38. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
39. Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 116-17. While Escobedo had adhered to Malloy, the
rationale in Miranda was also influenced in large part by an amicus brief to the Court by
the American Civil Liberties Union, which argued that as the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was granted to suspects in the stationhouse by Escobedo, the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination was similarly applicable to those same in-custody suspects.
See id. at 118-19.
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) ("All these policies point to one
overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against self-
incrimination] is the respect a government- state or federal-must accord to the dignity
and integrity of its citizens.").
41. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
42. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 469. Though the Court saw its holding in Miranda
as a means of curtailing the use of the Due Process voluntariness test to assess the
admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogations, courts have continued to
apply the Due Process test in other situations in and around the ambit of Miranda. See
1200
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In light of its detailed considerations of newer police interrogation
techniques found in police training manuals, 43 the Court found that
"[e]ven without employing brutality . . . the very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the
weakness of individuals." 44  Accordingly, it ordered a bright-line rule
requiring police officers to inform suspects in custody of their rights
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.4 ' Because police officers could
potentially abuse their power when questioning suspects, the Court held
that all interrogations must be preceded by a recitation of the suspect's
Fifth Amendment rights in order to ensure that the suspect was informed
sufficiently of his rights under the Constitution. 46 The Court considered
any statements taken after the suspect invoked his rights to be
presumptively coerced.47
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433-34 (2000) (acknowledging that the Court has
"never abandoned this due process jurisprudence, and thus continue[s] to exclude
confessions that were obtained involuntarily"); see also, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.
652, 662-66 (2004) (applying the totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a
suspect was in custody for purposes of interrogation); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,
112 (1995) (same); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (using the Due Process
voluntariness test in the context of police coercion). But cf. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.
680, 694-95 (1993) (upholding court review of Miranda issues in habeas claims, while
rejecting a voluntariness review under a Due Process totality of the circumstances
approach).
43. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55.
44. Id. at 455. Though its jurisprudence prior to Miranda had largely dealt with
physical abuse and coercion to obtain testimony, the Court recognized that police
interrogation techniques had become more complex, allowing them to exact a heavy toll
on a suspect without having to resort to physical violence. Id. at 455-56.
45. See id. at 478-79. As Chief Justice Warren stated, "a warning is a clearcut fact.
More important . .. a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to
overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the
privilege at that point in time." Id. at 469. Such language clearly indicates the Court's
eagerness to move away from the uncertainty of the Due Process voluntariness test toward
a more bright-line approach. See id. In creating this simple, bright-line rule, the Court
placed significant emphasis on the fact that, since police interrogations are largely
secretive in nature, courts are at a disadvantage in discovering what truly transpires in the
interrogation room. Id. at 448. Indeed, the secretive nature of police interrogation
continues even today, with some now calling for mandatory tape recording of all custodial
interrogations. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
309, 309 (2003) (arguing that, although only a handful of courts have found that a failure
to tape record a custodial interrogation is objectionable, all police interrogations should be
tape recorded under rights granted by the Constitution).
46. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76. By requiring police officers to undergo an
additional procedure before interrogating a suspect, Miranda curtailed the seemingly-
absolute power possessed by police in interrogation situations, and shifted the balance
toward protecting the rights of individuals under suspicion. Weisselberg, supra note 8, at
125.
47. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
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In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the holding in Miranda would
only serve "to discourage any confession., 41 In his opinion, the decision
had no foundation in the Fifth Amendment, and was instead only relying
on previous Sixth Amendment applications to justify applying the Fifth
Amendment. 9 Instead of deciding whether these violations fall under
the Fifth Amendment, Justice Harlan argued that the Court should
continue to use the common law voluntariness test under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause as a means of making such decisions.0
Under the Court's due process jurisprudence, he noted "the Court ha[d]
developed an elaborate, sophisticated, and sensitive approach to
admissibility of confessions" that was more encompassing, but less
exacting than the Miranda majority's Fifth Amendment test.51
C. Exceptions to Miranda's Bright-Line Rule
Beginning with the dissenters in Miranda,52 critics decried this decision
as having thrown the balance too far toward the suspect, and too far
away from the interests of ensuring effective law enforcement.
3
Seemingly in direct response to this outcry, the Court took definitive
steps toward tempering the bright-line rule of Miranda.4 In a series of
five major cases over the twenty years following Miranda,55 the Court
48. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice White also dissented for many of the
same reasons as Justice Harlan. Id. at 526-45 (White, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 506-07 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Due Process voluntariness
test is "a workable and effective means of dealing with confessions in a judicial manner").
51. Id. at 508, 511 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan further notes that there are
proper police techniques that may involve some pressure on the suspect; the voluntary
testimonial evidence obtained from these techniques would be admissible under the
Fourteenth Amendment but excluded under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 515
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Though he admitted that, under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process voluntariness test, greater intrusions on a person would be allowed, Harlan was
quick to point out that far greater intrusions on a person have been allowed by the courts
once they have probable cause against a suspect, and that, by comparison, the peaceful
interrogation of a suspect is not a huge intrusion on that suspect's rights. See id. at 517
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Due Process voluntariness test
already "provide[s] an adequate tool for coping with confessions"); id. at 526 (White, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Miranda's holding "has no significant support in the history of the
privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment").
53. See id. at 441 n.3 (citing a litany of anti-Miranda responses and amici briefs from
various individuals in the law enforcement field, including police chiefs, district attorneys,
and others).
54. See cases cited infra note 55.
55. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
1202
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slowly but deliberately chipped away at Miranda's constitutional
foundation,56 calling into question whether the warnings required by
Miranda were constitutionally mandated or merely prophylactic
measures taken to ensure that a suspect's constitutional rights were not
17infringed upon.
1. Harris and Hass: Rewriting the Rule for Impeachment
The first case that took affirmative steps in weakening the Miranda
decision was Harris v. New York. In Harris, the Court confronted a
case in which the defendant made potentially inculpatory statements to
the police immediately following his arrest, but before he was given a
complete recitation of his Miranda rights.59 Though it held that the
statements could not be used against the defendant in the prosecutor's
case-in-chief, the trial court determined that the statements could still be
used against the defendant for impeachment purposes.60
56. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
57. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653 ("[W]e believe that this case presents a situation where
concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the
prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda." (emphasis added)); see also Tucker, 417 U.S. at
445-46 ("[W]e have already concluded that the police conduct at issue here did not abridge
respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed
only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard
that privilege." (emphasis added)).
Congress also made an attempt in 1968 to circumvent the Miranda warning
requirement by passing a provision concerning the admissibility of confessions. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (a) (2000). This provision stated that admissibility of a suspect's in-custody
statements was dependent upon a trial judge's determination of whether the statement
was voluntarily made. Id. In determining the voluntariness of the suspect's statement, the
trial judge was instructed to take into consideration the circumstances surrounding the
confession, including whether or not the suspect was advised of his right to remain silent,
his right to an attorney, and that his statements could be used against him. Id. § 3501(b).
However, the existence or absence of any of these factors was not determinative of the
voluntariness of the statement. Id. It is this provision with which the Court took
particular issue in Dickerson. See discussion infra Part I.D.
58. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
59. Id. at 223-24 (noting that the statements made after the defendant was apprised of
his right to remain silent, but before he was advised of his right to an attorney could be
used against him). In the initial case at bar at the Appellate Division of New York State,
the record shows that the statements in question made by Harris were: (1) that Harris
acted as an agent for an undercover police officer in obtaining narcotics on one day; and
(2) that Harris obtained drugs from an unknown person outside of a bar and subsequently
sold those drugs to the undercover officer who then arrested Harris. People v. Harris, 298
N.Y.S.2d 245, 247 (App. Div.), aff d, 250 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1969), affd sub nom. Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Though the defendant admitted that he gave these
statements voluntarily, the trial court determined, and the assistant district attorney for
the case conceded that, under Miranda, the statements could not be used against the
defendant during the prosecution's case-in-chief. Id. at 246-48.
60. Harris, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
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After the case was affirmed on these grounds throughout the New
York State court system,6 1 a five to four Supreme Court decision held
that the use of these statements for impeaching the defendant was not
62
unconstitutional. Relying on its previous decision in Walder v. United
States,63 the Court held that Harris could not use his Fifth Amendment
protections under Miranda as "a license to use perjury by way of a
defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances.,64
In opposition to this holding, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Douglas and Marshall,65 wrote a blistering dissent which warned that the
holding in Harris "seriously undermine[s]" the objective set forth in
Miranda of ensuring that police interrogation practices do not violate a
suspect's constitutional rights.6' In his opinion, impeaching the defendant
with his own "partly-Mirandized" statements was unconstitutional
because a statement used as direct proof of guilt and a statement used to
impeach a witness's credibility are equally incriminating, and without
distinction in the Constitution.67 Accordingly, since a statement obtained
in violation of Miranda may not be used to prove the defendant's guilt
under the Fifth Amendment, that same statement may not be used to
impeach the defendant at trial.68 In closing his dissent, Justice Brennan
61. Harris, 250 N.E.2d at 350.
62. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224-26.
63. 347 U.S. 62 (1954). In Walder, the Court held in a Fourth Amendment case that,
though a defendant has the right to be protected from having illegally obtained evidence
used against him at trial, the defendant may not use that protection as "a shield against
contradiction of his untruths." Id. at 65. Accordingly, the Court held (in very similar
language to the Harris opinion) that "there is hardly justification for letting the defendant
affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to
challenge his credibility." Id. However, even by the Harris Court's own admission,
Walder concerned the use of evidence to impeach matters collateral to the charge, whereas
Harris involved using evidence to impeach the defendant's direct testimony. See Harris,
401 U.S. at 225; id. at 227-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court's willingness to
apply the impeachment exception to both direct and collateral matters was the major
difference between the majority and dissent's disparate opinions. Compare id. at 225-26,
with id. at 227-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 66-69 and accompanying
text.
64. Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.
65. Id. Justice Black also dissented, but provided no opinion. See id. at 226.
66. Id. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 231 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("'An incriminating statement is as
incriminating when used to impeach credibility as it is when used as direct proof of guilt
and no constitutional distinction can legitimately be drawn."' (quoting People v. Kulis, 221
N.E.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. 1966) (Keating, J., dissenting))).
68. Id. at 230-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also focused intently on
the damage the Harris holding would impose on a defendant's right to mount a defense.
Id. at 229-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Using Walder to his own advantage, Brennan
reminded the Court that:
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portentously predicted that the holding in Harris would open doors not
only to further attacks on Miranda, but more importantly to police
practices that would attempt to circumvent Miranda in an effort to obtain
statements from the defendant that could be used against him at trial if
the defendant chose to testify in his own defense. 9 As this Comment will
reveal, Justice Brennan's predictions have proven accurate.]7
Oregon v. Hass71 built upon the Harris exception, and extended it to
include situations in which the defendant initially was given a full
recitation of his Miranda rights and accepted them, but later, after
requesting an attorney (but before one could be provided for him) made
inculpatory statements to the police officers who had detained him. 7 In
"the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the
accusation against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case
against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way
of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case
in chief."
Id. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Walder, 347 U.S. at 65). Justice Brennan
further argued that Miranda established the Fifth Amendment as a "constitutional
specific[]" that guaranteed a defendant such rights to meet these accusations. Id. at 229
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Allowing the prosecution to use statements against the
defendant, Brennan contended, would deny the defendant an "unfettered" choice when
deciding to take the stand in his own defense. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965) (holding that, since the choice to testify
on one's own behalf is a constitutional right, such a decision should be "unfettered").
69. Harris, 401 U.S. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthering his argument, Justice
Brennan noted:
The Court today tells the police that they may freely interrogate an accused
incommunicado and without counsel and know that although any statement they
obtain in violation of Miranda cannot be used on the State's direct case, it may
be introduced if the defendant has the temerity to testify in his own defense. This
goes far toward undoing much of the progress made in conforming police
methods to the Constitution.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. See discussion infra Parts IIA-B.
71. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
72. Id. at 714-15. Initially, the trial court ruled that any statements obtained after the
defendant requested his attorney were inadmissible against him in the government's case-
in-chief, but could still be used for impeachment of the defendant's testimony if he took
the stand in his own defense. Id. at 716-17. However, the Oregon State Court of Appeals
reversed, relying upon a pre-Harris case, State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Or. 1967), which
held that un-Mirandized statements could not be used against the defendant for
impeachment purposes. State v. Hass, 510 P.2d 852, 855 (Or. Ct. App.), affd, 517 P.2d 671
(Or. 1973), rev'd sub noma. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). A closely divided Oregon
Supreme Court affirmed this decision. Hass, 517 P.2d at 673 (4-3 decision) (noting that in
situations where proper Miranda warnings are given, the police have nothing to lose and
much to gain by continuing to interrogate).
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reversing the Oregon Supreme Court's decision, the Court was much less
divided on this issue than it had been in Harris.7
The majority, authored by Justice Blackmun, saw "no valid distinction
to be made in the application of the principles of Harris to that case and
to Hass' case., 74 Relying on Harris, the Court held that evidence deemed
inadmissible by Miranda in the prosecution's case-in-chief is not
completely barred from all uses by the government, in particular, for
impeachment purposes.75 The Court went on to mention that it felt the
76purpose of the exclusionary aspect of Miranda's holding, namely
deterrence of police misconduct during interrogation, was adequately
served by making the defendant's statements inadmissible against him
during the prosecution's case-in-chief.77  To completely exclude the
defendant's statements in this case, even for impeachment purposes,
would undo the "balance [that] was struck in Harris, [by] pervert[ing] the
constitutional right [against self-incrimination] into a right to falsify...
evidence from the defendant's own mouth.,
78
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, continued to
raise the objections he previously made in his dissenting opinion in
Harris.79 However, the decision in Hass, Justice Brennan argued, went
far beyond the decision in Harris in undermining the efficacy of the
73. Hass, 420 U.S. at 714, 724 (voting 6-2 (Justice Douglas took no part in the
decision) to reverse the Oregon Supreme Court's ruling). It should be noted, however,
that this decision is not necessarily demonstrative of an ideological shift in the Court's
jurisprudential approach to Miranda. Rather, even at a glance at the voting members of
the Court between Harris and Hass, it is obvious that the addition of Justice Rehnquist to
replace Justice Black (who dissented in Harris) and the fact that Justice Douglas (another
Harris dissenter) did not take part in this decision at all were two major factors in the 6-2
outcome of the decision. See id.; Harris, 401 U.S. at 222, 226. Accordingly, it could be
argued that, if Justice Black had been on the Court instead of Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice Douglas had taken part in the decision itself, this decision very well may have been
closer than it turned out to be.
74. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722.
75. Id.
76. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding that, after the necessary
warnings are given, "the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him" (emphasis added)).
77. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722. This rationale echoes a similar rationale employed in the
Harris opinion by the majority. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 224. But see infra notes 227-32 and
accompanying text (discussing how the Patane/Seibert approach proposed in this Article
provides a more effective deterrent to police misconduct during custodial interrogation
than the mere exclusion of the statement during the prosecution's case-in-chief under
Hass).
78. Hass, 420 U.S. at 723.
79. Id. at 724-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Miranda decision." After Harris, police may have had an incentive to
administer the Miranda warnings in the hopes that any statements,
voluntarily given, could be used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief
against the defendant.8 ' By contrast, after Hass, Justice Brennan argued
that there was no longer any incentive to administer the Miranda
warnings because statements could be obtained and used against the
defendant for impeachment purposes, even after a suspect requests an
attorney.8 2
2. Tucker and Quarles: Problems with Prophylactics
Only three years after Harris, but before Hass, the Court took what is,
arguably, one of the biggest steps away from the Miranda holding in
Michigan v. Tucker.3 In Tucker, the Court questioned whether failure to
administer complete Miranda warnings infringed on the defendant's
constitutional right against self-incrimination, or merely constituted a
violation of "prophylactic rules developed to protect that right." 84 In
Tucker, the defendant was arrested on suspicion of rape and read each of
his Miranda rights, except his right to have an attorney appointed for him
if he could not afford one.85 During questioning, the defendant claimed
he was with a third party, Henderson, at the time the crime was
committed. 6 Though the trial court excluded the defendant's statements
from use in the prosecution's case-in-chief on the grounds that he did not
receive complete Miranda warnings, the Court allowed the introduction
of Henderson's statements at trial to prove Tucker's guilt.8 7
80. Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
84. Id. at 439. It should be noted here that Tucker, though a Miranda decision,
involved a great deal more than just the Miranda issue. See id. Weighing significantly on
the Court's decision in this case was the fact that, though the trial occurred after Miranda
was decided, the police officers' failure to administer the Miranda warnings occurred
before the case was decided. Id. at 447. This complexity is also indicated by the fact that
Justices Brennan and Marshall (traditional dissenters in cases that went against the
methodology in Miranda) concurred in the judgment on the grounds that Miranda did not
retroactively apply to interrogations before the ruling. Id. at 453 (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment).
85. Id. at 435-36.
86. Id. at 436. When questioned by police as to the veracity of Tucker's statements,
Henderson contradicted Tucker's claims and offered additional evidence that appeared to
inculpate Tucker. Id. at 436-37. Specifically, Henderson told police that Tucker had been
with him at one point in the day, but that they had parted company early in the day; the
next day, they met up again, and Henderson noticed and commented upon scratch marks
on Tucker's face. Id. at 436. In response, Tucker insinuated that he had had a rough
sexual encounter with a woman the night before. Id. at 437.
87. Id. at 437.
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Following the affirmation of his conviction by Michigan's court of
appeals and state supreme court,s Tucker appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court on the ground that his failure to receive adequate Miranda
warnings barred the use of all evidence, including third party evidence,
against him at trial.89  In affirming Tucker's conviction, the Court
concluded that the police officer's failure to give complete Miranda
warnings did not violate Tucker's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 9° Instead, the Court determined that the officer only
strayed from the "prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in
Miranda to safeguard that privilege," and not from a constitutional
requirement.91
Accepting the fact that the "pressures of law enforcement and the
vagaries of human nature" make it impossible to achieve a perfect police
investigation, 2  the Court sought to ensure that the bright-line
exclusionary rule in Miranda did not negate otherwise valid, good-faith
efforts by police to obtain information from suspects.93 Accordingly, the
Court employed a balancing test designed to determine the effect that
judicial sanctions should have on the admissibility of evidence obtained
when these warnings were not given in full. 94  Applying the test to
Tucker's case, the Court concluded that the evidence should not be
barred based on the fact that there was no coercion in the case, that the
police officer only inadvertently failed to give the defendant a complete
reading of the Miranda rules, and that the interrogation occurred before
the Court decided Miranda.95
Building on Tucker's rationale that the Miranda warnings were merely
prophylactic, the Court in New York v. Quarles96 considered the question
of whether there are certain situations in which public safety
considerations outweigh the necessity of giving Miranda warnings before
88. See People v. Tucker, 189 N.W.2d 290, 290 (Mich. 1971), aff'g 172 N.W.2d 712
(Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
89. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 438-39.
90. Id. at 444.
91. Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 446.
93. Id. ("Before we penalize police error ... we must consider whether the sanction
[of excluding use of the obtained statements] serves a valid and useful purpose.").
94. See id. at 445. Later in the decision, the Court further explained the test as
balancing the societal interest in prosecuting criminals against the individual's protections
under the Constitution. Id. at 450-51.
95. Id. at 445, 447. Additionally, the Court concluded that the trustworthiness of the
statement in question was not in danger of being compromised since it was a third party
statement not subject to the potentially coercive pressures of custodial interrogation. Id.
at 449. Accordingly, the Court found no plausible link between the admissibility of a third
party statement and failure to administer warnings to a defendant in custody. See id.
96. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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obtaining information from a suspect in custody.97 In Quarles, upon
apprehending the defendant, the police frisked him and, finding an
empty gun holster, asked the defendant where the gun was located, to
which he nodded toward the location where the police subsequently
found the gun.98  In upholding the introduction of the defendant's
statement at trial, the Court determined that, since the Miranda warnings
were merely a "'practical reinforcement' for the Fifth Amendment
right"99 against self-incrimination, the Court only needed to consider
whether or not, under the Tucker balancing test, the police officer was
justified in failing to administer these prophylactic Miranda warnings to
the defendant.'0t
In this situation, the Court rationalized that the safety of the police
officers and store customers demanded that the officers find the location
97. Id. at 651.
98. Id. at 652. According to the record, before apprehending the defendant, police
were given information from a woman claiming she had recently been raped by a male
fitting the defendant's description who had just entered a local supermarket. Id. at 651-52.
The woman also indicated that the man was armed with a gun. Id. at 652. After entering
the supermarket, one officer saw the defendant who, upon seeing the officer, immediately
fled toward the rear of the store, where he was eventually arrested, frisked and questioned
prior to being given Miranda warnings. Id. Based on these facts, it is interesting to note
the potential Fourth Amendment issues presented in this case, particularly the fact that
the search for the gun, being administered within the room in which the defendant was
apprehended, is allowable under the search incident to arrest doctrine, as explained in
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which gives officers the right to search the
person and surrounding areas in the interest of officer safety, id. at 763. Though the Court
in Quarles addressed the exigent circumstances aspect of the Fourth Amendment as it
applied to the case, it did so only briefly in one footnote. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653 n.3.
The Court eventually admitted the statement (for presumably similar reasons as would be
justified under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence), but the Court's decision to consider
the admissibility of the statement regarding the gun's location under the Fifth Amendment
and Miranda, instead of applying the Fourth Amendment, raises the question as to
whether or not this decision was more about taking down Miranda, and less about "public
safety." See id. at 684-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (questioning the true motives behind
the majority's rationale in creating the "public safety" exception to Miranda). But cf. id. at
663-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (claiming
that the "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule will create "a finespun new doctrine
on public safety exigencies incident to custodial interrogation, complete with the hair-
splitting distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence").
99. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444).
100. Id. at 654-55. Also at issue in this case was whether or not the gun itself was
inadmissible as a tainted fruit of the un-Mirandized statement. Id. at 651. The trial court
excluded both the statement under Miranda and the gun under the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine. Id. However, since the Court determined that the statement was
admissible, the Court ultimately concluded that the gun was also admissible. Id. at 659-60;
cf. id. at 660 n.9 ("Because we hold that there is no violation of Miranda in this case, we
have no occasion to reach arguments ... that the gun is admissible either because it is
nontestimonial or because the police would inevitably have discovered it absent their
questioning.").
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of the gun before someone got hurt.'0 ' Accordingly, the Court found that
a "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule existed under which
police officers could obtain information from the suspect without giving
him the Miranda warnings. °2  Though it conceded the potentially
muddying effect its ruling would have on Miranda jurisprudence, the
Court concluded that public safety concerns outweighed any incidental
burden on police officers caused by applying this exception.' 3
In his dissent, Justice Marshall scolded the majority for its failure to
consider the facts of the case,'04 and for departing from Miranda's
longstanding constitutional protection of a suspect's Fifth Amendment
101. Id. at 656-58. The Court recognized that, in apprehending a potentially armed
suspect, police officers must act out of "instinctive[] and largely unverifiable motives" to
protect themselves and obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect. Id. at 656.
102. Id. at 655-56. The Court held that such an exception clearly applied in situations
where "the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety
outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination." Id. at 657.
103. Id. at 658-59. Though she ultimately agreed with the Court's decision to remand
on the issue of the gun's admissibility as nontestimonial evidence, Justice O'Connor took
strong issue with the majority opinion's decision in Quarles to stray from the foundation of
Miranda. Id. at 660, 673-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor expressed displeasure with the Miranda holding, but
admitted that the Court did not amply justify its reasoning for departing from Miranda's
well-established reasoning. Id. at 660 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor showed equal displeasure at the majority's
almost brazen admission that its decision "lessen[ed] the desirable clarity" of the Miranda
rule. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also
supra note 98.
104. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 675 (Marshall, J., dissenting). With regard to the facts of the
case, Justice Marshall posited that there could be very little, if any, threat to the public
safety posed by the defendant in finding and using the gun because, at the time of the
defendant's arrest, he was handcuffed and surrounded by four police officers. See id. at
674-76, 685 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Indeed, as Justice Marshall points out, at the time
the defendant was asked where the gun was, "the arresting officers were sufficiently
confident of their safety to put away their guns," and, based on the officers' own
testimony, there was nothing about the situation to give the impression that any of the
officers felt at all as if their safety was in jeopardy. Id. at 675-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
cf. id. at 656-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (holding that the intent of the police officers is
not considered in determining whether a threat to public safety sufficiently exists).
Moreover, since the arresting officer "knew with a high degree of certainty that the
defendant's gun" had been thrown within the immediate area of the arrest, Justice
Marshall argued that the police could easily have diffused any potential threat to the
public safety by cordoning off the area to search for the weapon. Id. at 676 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). It appears here that Justice Marshall has almost opened the door to admission
of the gun under the Court's decision in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1983), which
interpreted the Court's decision in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), as
allowing items that would inevitably have been found to be admitted into evidence, even if
those items were discovered as a result of a constitutionally tainted investigation, see
Williams, 467 U.S. at 431, 441-43.
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rights against self-incrimination." s Justice Marshall argued that the
majority's rationale stemmed from a marked misunderstanding of the
Miranda decision.'16 He accused the majority of belittling Miranda into
nothing more than a balancing act between the enhanced protection of
Fifth Amendment rights and the cost to society of obtaining fewer
criminal convictions as a result of excluded testimony.' °  Such an
interpretation, Justice Marshall contended, was fallacious because at no
point did the majority in Miranda consider whether the costs to society
outweighed the benefits of its ruling." Based on this misreading of
Miranda, Justice Marshall concluded that the majority had reached a
decision at direct odds with the Miranda decision itself.'0
3. Oregon v. Elstad: Pushing Forward, Back on Miranda
In Oregon v. Elstad,"° the Court faced the issue of whether an initial
failure to read a defendant his Miranda rights, without more, affects the
admissibility of subsequent statements made after the defendant was
apprised of his rights."' In addressing this issue, the Court first held that
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine used in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence did not apply to Miranda violations."2  The Court
explained that the Fourth Amendment proscriptions dealt with activities
such as searches and seizures, the fruits of which are far more wide-
reaching."3  The Fifth Amendment, by contrast, prohibited only
compelled testimony, not failure to administer warnings." 4 Such a failure
was only a procedural violation of Miranda, whose exclusionary rule was,
until Elstad, much broader than the Fifth Amendment's own."'
105. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 674 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 681 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
107. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 681-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Marshall argued, the
Court was only concerned with extending the Fifth Amendment protections into custodial
interrogations. Id. at 682 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 684 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall explained:
In fashioning its "public-safety" exception to Miranda, the majority makes no
attempt to deal with the constitutional presumption established by that case ....
Without establishing that interrogations concerning the public's safety are less
likely to be coercive than other interrogations, the majority cannot endorse the
"public-safety" exception and remain faithful to the logic of Miranda v, Arizona.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
110. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
111. Id. at 300.
112. See id. at 306-07.
113. See id. at 306.
114. Id. at 306-07.
115. Id.
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In upholding the admissibility of the post-warning statement for use in
the prosecution's case-in-chief, the Court considered the innocence of
the mistake made by the officer, and the fact that there was a degree of
uncertainty surrounding the apprehension that inevitably caused some
confusion for the arresting officers.' 6  The Court also took into
consideration the difference in circumstances surrounding the statement
obtained before the warning and after the warning."7 In the Court's
mind, the fact that the pre-warned statement was deemed inadmissible at
trial satisfied Miranda."8
D. Attempting to Rekindle the Miranda Flame: Dickerson and Its
Progeny
The ensuing uncertainty created by both the Court decisions and
Congress has given critics of Miranda numerous reasons to call for its
removal."' This criticism reached its peak on the eve of Dickerson v.
United States,12 with some critics believing that Miranda had finally seen
its last days. Notwithstanding this criticism, Dickerson did not toll the
death knell for Miranda.'22
In Dickerson, the Court considered a case from the Fourth Circuit in
which the FBI arrested and interrogated the defendant, 23 who was
116. Id. at 315-16. In addition, given that there was, at best, a "speculative and
attenuated" causal connection between the two sets of questioning, and the fact that the
defendant's later statements were made after he was fully informed and at the
stationhouse, the Court concluded that the statement obtained after the Miranda warnings
were voluntarily given and, therefore, admissible for use in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
Id. at 313-16.
117. Id. at 314-15.
11& Id. at 317-18.
119. See, e.g., Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Paul G. Cassell Urging
Affirmance of the Judgment Below at *4-*28, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000) (No. 99-5525), 2000 WL 272005 (arguing in favor of affirming the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Dickerson that recognized Congress' authority to prescribe rules governing
police interrogation practices); see also Young, supra note 3, at 54-56.
120. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
121. See, e.g., Young, supra note 3, at 56.
122. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 ("We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional
decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we
decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.").
123. Id. Before his trial, the defendant moved to suppress a statement he made at the
FBI's field office on the ground that he had not received a reading of his Miranda rights
when he made the statement. Id. The federal district court granted the defendant's
motion, and the government appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Id.; see also United States v.
Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. 1023, 1023 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev'd, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999),
rev'd, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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indicted for bank robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.124 Instead
of trying this case under Miranda, the Fourth Circuit decided it under 18
U.S.C. § 3501, a statute passed shortly after Miranda was decided, but
which had not previously been relied upon."5 Congress stated in § 3501
that the sine qua non of a statement's admissibility was whether or not
the statement was voluntarily made. 26
In reviewing the government's motion to deny suppression of the
statement, the Fourth Circuit conceded that the defendant gave his
statement without the benefit of Miranda warnings.12 7  However, the
Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded that Miranda was not a
constitutional case and that Congress, not the Court, could have the final
determination of the rules surrounding the admissibility of statements at
trial."" Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit granted the government's motion
to deny suppression of the statement because the evidence supported the
conclusion that the statement was given voluntarily.12 9
In reviewing the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Court took great pains
to assert Miranda's constitutionality. 3 " According to the Court, Miranda
is constitutional because the Court continuously applied its ruling to state
court proceedings, even though the Court does not have state court
supervisory power. ' The Court also held that, though there had been
124. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. The defendant was also charged with use of a firearm
in the course of committing a crime of violence; each violation was a federal violation
under Title 18 of the United States Code. Id.
125. Id. In fact, § 3501 had been used so infrequently before Dickerson that Justice
Scalia scolded both the Supreme Court and other courts for failing to apply §3501 to cases
involving custodial interrogations. See infra note 139.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2000). In § 3501, Congress eschewed the warning
requirement set forth in Miranda in favor of a totality of the circumstances test in which
no one element's existence or omission can determine whether the statement is made
voluntarily. Id.
127. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671 (noting that, although voluntary, the confession
had been suppressed "because it was obtained in technical violation of Miranda").
128. Id. at 672.
129. Id. at 671.
130. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438-44. In asserting Miranda's constitutionality, the
majority, via Justice Rehnquist, relied in great force upon a detailed and informative
history of the admissibility of confessions against the suspect. Id. at 432-37.
131. Id. at 438. In addition, the majority noted, the language of the Miranda opinion
itself repeatedly indicates that the majority believed it was creating a constitutional
decision. Id. at 439-40 & 439 n.4 (quoting various passages from the Miranda holding
which indicate the Miranda majority's understanding that it was addressing a
"constitutional" issue); see also id. at 439 n.3 (noting that the constitutionality of Miranda
is bolstered by the fact that the Court has allowed prisoners to bring forth alleged Miranda
violations to the attention of federal courts in petitions for habeas corpus).
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some major exceptions to Miranda,'32 these exceptions did not erase
Miranda's constitutional basis.133  Thus, the exceptions to Miranda's
bright-line rule were merely a series of to-be-expected modifications that
accompany general rules, which are as much rooted in the Constitution
as the original parent ruling.1
4
In soundly reversing the Fourth Circuit's decision, a seven-Justice
majority held that § 3501 was an attempt by Congress to overrule the
Miranda decision.' Given Miranda's constitutional basis, Congress did
not have the right to supersede its ruling; Congress could only prescribe
procedures that were, at a minimum, as effective as the warnings
themselves."' The Court determined that, without a strict warning
132. Id. at 441; see, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (creating a
"public safety" exception); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975) (extending the
impeachment exception); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (stating that
Miranda represents a procedural safeguard, and does not establish independent rights
requiring constitutional protection); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)
(creating the impeachment exception).
133. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441. Rather, the Court pointed out, these exceptions
demonstrate "not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule -but that no constitutional rule
is immutable." Id.
134. Id. Admittedly, even after Dickerson, the Court's assertion of Miranda's
"constitutionality" leaves something to be desired. See Weisselberg, supra note 12, at
1131-34. As Professor Yale Kamisar pointed out in 2003, "[tlhere also seems to be a
consensus (one that I share) that what Dickerson reaffirmed was not the Miranda doctrine
that burst on the scene in 1966, but Miranda with all the exceptions it has acquired since
1966 frozen in time." Yale Kamisar, Weighing Poison Fruit, AM. LAWYER, Oct. 2003, at
65, 67. Though it claims that the decision is constitutionally based, the Court, for all
intents and purposes, concedes that Miranda's requirements are both constitutional and
prophylactic (two terms with seemingly opposite meanings). See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at
437-38. Using such language as "we concede that there is language in some of our
opinions that supports the view taken by [the Fourth Circuit,]" that Miranda's protections
are not constitutionally required, certainly does little to reassert Miranda on its own two
feet. Id. at 438. Nevertheless, by overturning 18 U.S.C. § 3501, Dickerson has shown in no
uncertain terms the Court's intention of keeping Miranda "on the books," while still
maintaining the validity of its progeny. See id. at 441.
135. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 430, 436.
136. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441-42; see also id. at 437 ("The law in this area is clear ...
Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules
of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution.... But Congress
may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution."
(citations omitted)). The Dickerson majority concluded that, though the Miranda
warnings were not intended to be a "'constitutional straightjacket,'' the Miranda Court
only intended this statement to mean that the warnings were created as a minimum
threshold of the protection of an individual's Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 440 n.6
(quoting United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)), rev'd, 530 U.S. 428). Therefore, Congress was free to
change or replace the specifics of the warnings, so long as the procedures "were 'at least as
effective' in" informing an individual of his continuing right to remain silent during police
interrogation. Id. at 440 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
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requirement as prescribed in Miranda, § 3501 did not sufficiently meet
the constitutional minimum established in that case.
37
In dissent, Justice Scalia made his distaste for the Miranda decision
well-documented."9 Taking a textualist approach, Justice Scalia argued
vociferously that the majority's assertion of Miranda's constitutionality
was tenuous because, despite its use of constitutional rhetoric in
upholding Miranda, the majority failed to demonstrate that the
Constitution actually required the use of Miranda warnings.39 Moreover,
Justice Scalia argued, the exceptions to Miranda indicate that the
Miranda warnings are merely prophylactic procedures designed to
137. Id. at 442-43.
138. See id. at 444-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is not the first time Scalia has been
outspoken against Miranda. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 405 (1998)
("In the modern age of frequently dramatized 'Miranda' warnings, [it] is implausible [for a
suspect to be unaware of his right to remain silent under Miranda]."); Jaffee v. Redmond,
518 U.S. 1. 19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the State is a "victim of . . .
injustice" when confessions obtained without Miranda warnings are excluded at trial).
However, Justice Scalia made his distaste for Miranda most well-known in Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). In Davis, Justice Scalia chastised the Department of Justice
for refusing to bring prosecutions invoking 18 U.S.C. § 3501 concerning admissibility of
statements made during custodial interrogations. See id. at 463-64 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("In fact, with limited exceptions the provision has been studiously avoided by every
Administration, not only in this Court but in the lower courts, since its enactment more
than 25 years ago."). Justice Scalia did not stop there, adding:
Legal analysis of the admissibility of a confession without reference to [§ 35011 is
equivalent to legal analysis of the admissibility of hearsay without consulting the
Rules of Evidence; it is an unreal exercise. Yet as the Court observes, that is
precisely what the United States has undertaken in this case ....
The United States' repeated refusal to invoke § 3501, combined with the courts'
traditional (albeit merely prudential) refusal to consider arguments not raised, has
caused the federal judiciary to confront a host of "Miranda" issues that might be
entirely irrelevant under federal law. Worse still, it may have produced-during
an era of intense national concern about the problem of runaway crime-the
acquittal and the nonprosecution of many dangerous felons, enabling them to
continue their depredations upon our citizens. There is no excuse for this ....
The point is whether our continuing refusal to consider § 3501 is consistent with
the Third Branch's obligation to decide according to the law. I think it is not.
Id. at 463-65 (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).
139. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia brazenly defied
the majority when it failed to locate within the Constitution any provision that is violated
by § 3501. Id. at 445 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (illustrating that both Miranda and § 3501
ultimately prevent the use of compelled, involuntary statements at trial). Bolstering his
argument, Justice Scalia pointed out that the majority essentially conceded in its opinion
that a police officer may fail to give warnings, and thus violate Miranda, without violating
a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 451 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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protect an individual's right against self-incrimination, and are notS 140
constitutionally required.
Soon after Dickerson, the Court had two more opportunities to further
interpret Miranda. Decided this past term, Missouri v. Seibert
1 4
1
considered the admissibility of incriminating statements obtained as a
result of "question-first" interrogation tactics. 42 In considering the case
on appeal, 1 4 the Court acknowledged the emergence of, and potentially
dangerous issues created by, "question-first" interrogation4 In the
140. Id. at 450-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In calling for Miranda's removal, Justice
Scalia reminded the Court that voluntariness is the constitutional standard of determining
whether a statement is admissible against a defendant-not whether Miranda warnings
were given. Id. at 464 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Though he admitted it is a celebrated
decision, Justice Scalia argued that Miranda stands only as a demonstration of the Court's
"power to impose extra-constitutional constraints upon Congress and the States." Id. at
465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
142. Id. at 2605. According to the facts, the defendant was arrested on suspicion of
murdering her physically disabled son by deliberately setting fire to their house while he
was asleep inside. Id. at 2605-06. When the defendant was arrested, the arresting officer
(Clinton) was under instruction from Officer Hanrahan to deliberately refrain from
reading the defendant her Miranda rights. Id. at 2606. Once the defendant arrived at the
stationhouse, Officer Hanrahan interrogated Seibert for approximately forty minutes
without informing her of her rights. Id. During the course of the initial interrogation,
Seibert confessed to the crime, after which she was left alone for approximately twenty
minutes, until Officer Hanrahan reentered, informed the defendant of her Miranda rights
and then, after obtaining a waiver from defendant of her rights, proceeded to take her
"official" confession. Id.
143. Id. at 2607. At trial, the defendant sought to exclude both her pre- and post-
warning statements. Id. at 2606. The trial court granted suppression of the pre-warning
statements, but allowed admission of statements made after the warning on the ground
that they were "voluntary." Id. at 2606-07. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the
decision because, given the proximity of the two interrogations, the post-warning
confession was a product of the invalidly obtained pre-warning confession. Id. at 2606; see
also State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 701 (Mo. 2002), affd sub nom. Missouri v. Seibert, 124
S. Ct. 2601 (2004). In the Missouri Supreme Court's mind, to allow an "end run" around
Miranda by letting police officers take advantage of the exception created by the Harris
decision by deliberately withholding a recitation of the Miranda warnings, would only
serve to further encourage such a practice. Id. at 706-07. Undoubtedly, the Missouri
Supreme Court felt, as this Comment argues, that the police already have such an
advantage over the suspect during interrogation. See id. (explaining that these tactics
deprive a defendant of knowingly waiving his Miranda rights). Interrogating a suspect by
deliberately violating Miranda only serves to exacerbate this advantage. See infra notes
179-80 and accompanying text. Therefore, in this author's opinion, the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision makes the most sense when read as an attempt to temper such a
potentially Orwellian practice.
144. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2608 (plurality opinion) (commenting on the practice of
deliberately withholding Miranda warnings until after a confession is obtained as "a new
challenge to Miranda" that has potentially nationwide reach); see also id. at 2608-09 &
2609 n.2 (plurality opinion) (noting a growing trend in police training manuals that
advocate "question-first" tactics, in reliance upon the Court's decision in Harris, which
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Court's mind, "question-first" interrogation tactics sought to render
moot the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings by waiting to read a
suspect her rights until after she has confessed. 14' Accordingly, a plurality
of Justices agreed that courts must determine whether it is objectively
reasonable to conclude that the Miranda warnings effectively advised the
suspect that she has a "real choice" about giving a potentially-
incriminating and admissible statement to the police at the time the
warnings were given.'46  In affirming the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision, the plurality concluded that, "[b]y any objective measure ... it
is likely that if the interrogators employ the technique of withholding
warnings until after interrogation succeeds in eliciting a confession, the
warnings will be ineffective in preparing the suspect for successive
interrogation, close in time and similar in content.,
14
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy agreed that, under the
conditions of the present case, the post-warning testimony was
inadmissible, but ultimately felt that the plurality's objective
reasonableness test was too broad.4 8 According to Justice Kennedy, the
allows for unwarned statements to be used against the suspect at trial for impeachment
purposes).
145. Id. at 2610 (plurality opinion). Though it acknowledged that questioning "outside
Miranda" was effective in eliciting confessions, the Court nonetheless declared that such a
practice struck at the heart of the Miranda decision. Id. at 2610-11, 2613 (plurality
opinion) ("[T]he question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart Miranda's purpose of
reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted."); see also id. at 2614
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (holding that the "question-first" technique "is
designed to circumvent Miranda. It undermines the Miranda warning and obscures its
meaning.").
146. Id. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
147. Id. (plurality opinion). In reaching this decision, the Court employed a two-part
test to first determine whether or not the confessions were coerced, and if not, whether or
not the warnings, if given, could have effectively served their purpose. Id. at 2613
(plurality opinion). In determining the efficacy of the warnings, the Court attempted to
query even deeper. See id. at 2610 (plurality opinion) ("Could the warnings effectively
advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that
juncture? Could they reasonably convey that he could choose to stop talking even if he
had talked earlier?").
148. Id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Instead, Justice Kennedy
argued that the Court should follow the "balanced and pragmatic approach to
enforcement of the Miranda warning" found in Elstad. Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment). In Justice Kennedy's opinion, following Elstad would allow
the Court to distinguish between instances in which Miranda had been legitimately
violated, and situations involving good faith failure by police officers to adhere to
Miranda. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that, though testimony
under the former category should rightfully be suppressed by the courts, to suppress a
suspect's inculpatory testimony under this latter category of Miranda violation "would
serve 'neither the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence"' (alteration in original) (quoting
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985))).
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Court's rationale in Elstad should determine the admissibility of post-
warning statements, except in rare situations where "question-first" is
used to deliberately circumvent the Miranda warning requirement, and
the police rely on a suspect's pre-warned statement to obtain a post-
warning statement. 149  In her dissent, Justice O'Connor lauded the
plurality's decision to reject an intent-based test, 15 but argued that based
on its decision in Elstad, the Court should have vacated the decision and
remanded it to the Missouri courts to determine the voluntariness of the
defendant's statements. 5'
Decided on the same day as Seibert, United States v. Patane
1 2
considered the question of whether or not the physical fruits of a
defendant's unwarned, but voluntary statements may be used against the
defendant at trial.'53 In determining that the defendant's Glock pistol
149. Id. at 2616. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) In these unique situations,
Justice Kennedy would have the trial court focus on the circumstances surrounding the
unwarned interrogation to determine admissibility. Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment). But cf id. at 2617 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality's
decision to reject Justice Kennedy's notion of an intent-based test on the ground that
"[t]houghts kept inside a police officer's head cannot affect" whether or not a statement
was voluntary). However, even if the requisite deliberate intent to undermine Miranda is
found, Justice Kennedy intimated that a post-warning statement might nonetheless be
deemed admissible if curative measures or circumstances are present. Id. at 2616
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (indicating that a "substantial break in time and
circumstances" between the pre-warned statement and Miranda warnings, or even an
"additional warning that explains the likely inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial
statement" would likely be sufficient curative measures that would "ensure that a
reasonable person in the suspect's situation would understand the import and effect of the
Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver").
150. Id. at 2617 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also applauded the
plurality for rejecting the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in Miranda cases. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2619-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Interestingly enough, though Justice
O'Connor requested that the Missouri courts consider the issue of admissibility of the
defendant's statements, it appears plain that even Justice O'Connor (and the three
Justices who joined in her dissent) was uncomfortable with the "question-first" tactic
employed by the police department in this case. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Though she relied on Elstad as her reasoning for dissenting from the plurality, Justice
O'Connor was careful to distinguish the facts of Elstad from Seibert. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("Although I would leave this analysis for the Missouri courts to conduct on
remand, I note that, unlike the officers in Elstad, Officer Hanrahan referred to Seibert's
unwarned statement during the second part of the interrogation when she made a
statement at odds with her unwarned confession.").
152. 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
153. Id. at 2624. In this case, police officers sought out the defendant for violating a
restraining order. Id. at 2624-25. The defendant had previously been arrested and was
under the temporary restraining order as a result. Id. Before arresting the defendant,
police officers were informed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
that the defendant was in possession of a Glock pistol. Id. at 2625. Upon his arrest, the
police officers made an attempt to read the defendant his Miranda rights, but were
1218
2005] Taking Back Miranda 1219
was admissible against him at trial, a plurality led by Justice Thomas held
that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to cases
where a suspect is not read his Miranda rights.1 4 The Court's primary
rationale was that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination largely concerns the suspect's own coerced testimonial
evidence being used against him. s  The plurality considered this
protection a "'fundamental trial right."'"56 Therefore, even if a police
officer failed (accidentally or deliberately) to administer Miranda
warnings to a suspect, a violation of the suspect's Fifth Amendment
rights would not occur until those statements were used against him at
trial. The non-testimonial fruits of those statements presumably are
not subject to such coercive influences and therefore may be used against
a suspect at trial.
58
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the
judgment, agreeing with the plurality that the admission of non-
testimonial fruits of the defendant's statement did not pose a risk of the
defendant's statements being used against him at trial. 9 However, they
felt the plurality needlessly characterized the police officer's failure to
give Miranda warnings as a non-constitutional violation.160 In dissent,
Justice Souter took issue with the fact that the decision provided "an
interrupted when the defendant informed the police that he was aware of his rights;
neither officer subsequently completed the recitation of the Miranda warnings. Id. The
defendant then informed the police of the location of the gun, which was retrieved. Id.
The defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. At trial,
the defendant, charged with possession of a firearm (a parole violation), sought to
suppress the admission of the gun he had in his possession at the time of his arrest on the
ground that it was the fruit of an unwarned statement. Id. The Tenth Circuit suppressed
the gun on the ground that, after Dickerson, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was
not barred from being applied to Miranda cases even though the Court held otherwise in
both Tucker and Elstad. Id. at 2624-26. Accordingly, the gun was inadmissible as a fruit
obtained from an invalid interrogation. United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1014 (10th
Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
154. Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2624, 2626 (plurality opinion).
155. Id. at 2626 (plurality opinion).
156. Id. at 2628 (plurality opinion) (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691
(1993) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990))).
157. Id. at 2628-29 (plurality opinion).
158. Id. at 2629-30 (plurality opinion).
159. Id. at 2630-31 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The two Justices also
agreed that Dickerson did not serve to overrule or diminish in authority any of the
subsequent "exceptions" to Miranda. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see
also supra note 134 and accompanying text.
160. Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2631 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Rather,
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor felt the case could have been sufficiently decided on the
ground that it presented a stronger argument for admission of the evidence than Elstad
and Tucker, two cases that allowed the evidence to come in. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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important inducement" for interrogators to intentionally disregard
Miranda altogether) 6' Though he admitted that the inadmissibility of
statements taken without Miranda warnings might come at the price of
obtaining a conviction, Justice Souter contended that the protection of an
individual's Fifth Amendment rights was worth such a price."'
E. Miranda Morass Makes Mess for States
Though the Court has not specifically decided whether a deliberate
163
violation of a suspect's rights under Miranda is constitutional, some
state courts have weighed in on the subject.' 4 However, given the
161. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In Justice Souter's opinion, creating an "evidentiary
benefit" of admissibility when an unwarned statement leads investigators to fruits of a
confession would only serve to encourage those investigators to deliberately disregard
Miranda altogether. Id. at 2631-32 (Souter, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Souter
also appeared to find the Court's holding in Patane particularly bothersome in light of the
fact that the Court decided Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004), on the same day, but reached a
very different result. See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2632 (Souter, J., dissenting).
162. Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2631 32.
163. See discussion supra Parts I.A-D. Indeed, based on the leaning of a majority of
the Justices in Seibert, there is the distinct possibility that the Court may not wish to enter
into a debate as to the specific, subjective intent of the police officer in deciding to
withhold Miranda warnings. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 n.6 & 2614-17 (2004) (plurality
opinion). This would not be the first time the Court has decided it did not want to delve
into determinations of a police officer's subjective intent. See Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 812-13, 819 (1996) (holding that, in a Fourth Amendment context, so long as
probable cause exists to justify stopping a suspect for a potential violation of law, meaning
that the police officer's conduct is "objectively justifiable behavior," a police officer's
subjective motive for stopping the suspect does not render such conduct a Fourth
Amendment violation); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 & n.35 (1984) (noting
that a police officer's subjective intent does not bear on whether a suspect is in custody for
interrogation purposes).
164. See, e.g., People v. Neal, 72 P.3d 280, 286, 288-89 (Cal. 2003) (holding that, in light
of the totality of the circumstances, testimony was involuntary under the Due Process
voluntariness test when elicited from a suspect who was initially interrogated without
being given Miranda warnings, then incarcerated overnight without food, water or access
to a bathroom, and then woke up the next morning and confessed to the charges against
him; consequently, the inculpatory statements were inadmissible at any point in the trial,
including for impeachment purposes); People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212, 1218-20, 1225-28
(Cal. 1998) (holding that the Harris exception allowing use of confessions for
impeachment purposes applied to intentional violations of Miranda where the defendant
had not claimed his confession was involuntary, but indicating in dicta that it would
reconsider the holding of this case if evidence eventually showed that the practice of
deliberately withholding Miranda rights was widespread); Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766,
773-75, 782-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding it was error to admit a deliberately un-
Mirandized written confession to additional crimes during the sentencing stage of a trial,
but ultimately finding this error harmless in light of the vast amount of additional direct
testimony corroborating the confessional statement), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2836 (2004);
State v. Knapp, 666 N.W.2d 881, 887, 892, 899-900, 903-05 (Wis. 2003), vacated sub nom.
by, Wisconsin v. Knapp, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (vacating judgment and remanding to
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inconsistency with which the Supreme Court has approached Miranda
jurisprudence, it is no surprise that the states' approaches to this issue are
equally inconsistent.65 In light of this inconsistency, it is readily apparent
that the Court can and should provide the states with guidance.'
66
II. INADEQUATE EFFORTS AT CURBING DELIBERATE MIRANDA
VIOLATIONS
A. "Outside Miranda" and "Question-First": Problematic Byproducts of
the Court's Indecision
As Professor Charles D. Weisselberg points out, state and federal
prosecutors, as well as police, are confused as to the status of Miranda
jurisprudence and the limits of its strictures. 67  Before the Court's
decision in Dickerson, there was an upswing in the practice of
questioning "outside Miranda."'6 As a result, proponents of this practice
began to inform police officers across the country that, notwithstanding
their failure to give Miranda warnings, officers still could obtain
Supreme Court of Wisconsin for consideration in light of Patane); see also Cal. Attorneys
for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that police
"[o]fficers who intentionally violate the rights protected by Miranda must expect to have
to defend themselves in civil actions"), amended by Nos. 97-56499, 97-56510, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3 (9th Cir. 2000); Henry v. Kernan, 177 F.3d 1152, 1155-58, 1160 (9th Cir.)
(reversing the state and district courts' denials of the appellant's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that, under the Due Process voluntariness test, the
interrogation, though calmly administered, involved tactics of severe psychological
coercion of the appellant), amended by 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1999).
165. See supra note 164.
166. Notwithstanding the notion held by true believers in federalism that states should
be allowed to "experiment" with rules of criminal procedure at the state level, the Court
has repeatedly shown its preference for creating a national standard for rules governing
rights of individuals in the context of a criminal search, investigation, or prosecution. See,
e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is obligatory in both federal and state courts via the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and that, therefore, a defendant is
guaranteed assistance of counsel in any criminal proceeding); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961) ("[Tlhe Fourth Amendment's right of privacy is enforceable against [the states]
by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government.").
167. See Weisselberg, supra note 12, at 1140-44, 1146, 1148-49, 1153-54; Weisselberg,
supra note 8, at 132-40 (exploring various law enforcement training materials).
168. See supra note 144. Relying on the Court's rationale in Harris, Tucker, Quarles
and Elstad, which questioned the constitutionality of Miranda's requirements, proponents
of this new questioning technique argue that, because Miranda was merely a weak
evidentiary rule and not a definitive constitutional rule, police officers and investigators
who did not administer Miranda rights did not, thereby, violate the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 132-36.
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information from the suspect for impeachment purposes.'69 Though the
Court's holding in Dickerson somewhat tempered the promotion of this
view,7 the cases noted by the Seibert Court, 7' as well as the facts of the
Seibert case,'72 indicate that the troubling practices of "question-first" and
"outside Miranda" interrogations have not gone away.173
B. Are Police Officers Free to Deliberately Disregard Miranda? Applying
Professor Clymer's Cost-Benefit Approach
In his article, Professor Steven D. Clymer argues that the Court has
reinforced a system of incentives for police officers to violate Miranda
rules by only excluding the use of confessional statements against a
defendant during the case-in-chief, while still allowing the confessions to
be used for impeachment, instead of choosing to impose a much stricter
affirmative duty on police officers to comply with Miranda.14 Professor
Clymer posits that a police officer's decision to give or disregard Miranda
warnings depends on the officer applying a simple cost-benefit analysis to
his situation, as opposed to deciding whether to adhere to a
- 175
constitutional requirement. Accordingly, "[i]f police [officers] are
169. See Weisselberg, supra note 8, at 132-38 & 138 n.152; see also Philipsborn, supra
note 1, at 20; CALIFORNIA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, MIRANDA VIOLATIONS,
POLICE TRAINING AND VOLUNTARINESS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, at http://www.cacj.
org/policy statements/policy-statement_12.htm (last visited July 10, 2005).
170. See Weisselberg, supra note 12, at 1152-53; cf Stephen D. Clymer, Are Police Free
To Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 525-27 (2002).
171. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2609 nn.2-3 (2004).
172. Id. at 2606.
173. See supra notes 171-72. Indeed, as Professor Susan R. Klein points out, the
current system has done little to eliminate incentives to deliberately violate Miranda. See
Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1355-57 (2003) ("[E]ven in
those cases where exclusion from the prosecutor's case-in-chief is a possibility, this remedy
alone is plainly insufficient to pcrsuade the police to obey Supreme Court commands.").
174. Clymer, supra note 170, at 503. Professor Clymer adds that, since Miranda is a
rule of admissibility of evidence in court, Miranda violations can technically occur only if
the evidence is used against the defendant at trial. See id. at 450 n.9. Accordingly, though
admissibility of a suspect's statement depends in large part on the police officer's conduct
during the custodial interrogation, it is impossible under the Court's current understanding
of Miranda for a police officer to actually violate the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination. See id.
175. ld. at 451. Naturally, Professor Clymer's premise is founded on the assumption
that getting a deliberately unwarned statement during custodial interrogation does not
constitute a violation of an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. See id. at 449-51. Though an analysis of the relative merits of this premise
is beyond the scope of this Comment, Professor Clymer's insights as to the cost-benefit
analysis undertaken by police officers in choosing to adhere to or disregard Miranda are
nonetheless useful in that they further demonstrate the fact that "question-first" and
"outside Miranda" techniques are likely to continue. See discussion supra Part 1I.B; see
also infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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willing to suffer the exclusionary consequences," they can choose to
ignore Miranda without fear of violating the Constitution. 76
Applying this cost-benefit analysis to "question-first" and "outside
Miranda" techniques, Professor Clymer contends that if the officer
believes the suspect is likely to invoke his right to remain silent if given a
warning, then refraining from giving the Miranda warnings is
advantageous because, at a minimum, if the suspect says nothing, he may
nevertheless be impeached with his own pre-warning silence at trial.'77
By the same token, if the officer is incorrect in his assumption, and the
suspect chooses to talk, the evidence is still admissible to impeach the
suspect should he take the stand and testify contrary to his unwarned
statements. 7 8 In Professor Clymer's assessment, until the Court either
overrules Miranda or more firmly reestablishes its basis in the Fifth
Amendment, police officers will continue to find ample incentive to
deliberately violate Miranda during custodial interrogation. 7 9
176. Clymer, supra note 170, at 450. Professor Clymer claims police have every reason
to question a suspect in custody before giving Miranda warnings, particularly in light of
the Court's decisions in Harris and Hass concerning admissibility of evidence for
impeachment purposes. Id. at 505-06. While there are certainly many instances in which
the police officer would find it advantageous to comply with Miranda's requirements,
Professor Clymer argues that the Court has created an equal amount of exceptional
situations in which it is far more advantageous for police to completely disregard Miranda
in order to obtain desired testimony; using statements obtained in violation of Miranda for
impeachment purposes is one of these situations. Id. at 450-51. In addition, Professor
Clymer points out other situations where it is advantageous for a police officer "to violate
the Miranda rules: preservation of [a] suspect['s] postarrest silence for impeachment[;]
taking unwarned statements and then 'curing' the violations." Id. at 451.
177. Id. Professor Clymer aptly points out that the Miranda Court alluded in dictum
to protecting a suspect's post-Miranda warning silence from use at trial against the suspect.
See id. at 503. He also notes how the Court has faced this issue in its decisions since
Miranda. See id. at 503-05; see also, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (holding
that the prosecution could impeach the defendant's testimony with unwarned post-arrest
silence); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-41 (1980) (holding that the prosecution
may use a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-warning silence to impeach his testimony at trial);
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating
that "the use for impeachment purposes of [the defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest
and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
178. Clymer, supra note 170, at 506-07. In addition to the obvious benefit of ensuring
that the defendant testifies truthfully, the threat of impeachment has the added potential
effect of deterring the defendant from testifying at trial in his defense and, in some cases,
from even going to trial at all. Id. at 506.
179. Id. at 527-28. In addition, Professor Clymer points out that if the Court preserves
Miranda as it is with its current exceptions, more pressure will be placed on suspects to
answer questions, particularly if the police deliberately disregard Miranda during
interrogation. Id. at 528. He notes:
If police instead question [the suspect] without warnings or continue the
interrogation despite his request to remain silent or consult counsel, he
2005]
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C. Judicial Interrogation: The Amar-Lettow Approach
One approach to solving deliberate police violations of Miranda is
proposed by Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Ren6e B. Lettow.1 88
Professors Amar and Lettow advocate creating a system of custodial
interrogation in which suspects are questioned by judicial officers instead
of police officers. Under such a proposal, a suspect would receive
immunity at trial from use of testimony obtained at a pretrial hearing,
but would not be protected from police using the testimony derivatively
to search out other sources of information that might be used against
him. 12 While Amar and Lettow would not strictly prohibit stationhouse
confessions altogether under their proposal, they contend that courts
could severely limit the admissibility of confessions obtained during in-
custody stationhouse questioning to statements "volunteered by a
suspect in the presence of an on-duty defense lawyer or ombudsman in
the police station. 1 3 Such a "strict regime," Amar and Lettow argue,
"would create powerful incentives to conduct interrogation before
magistrates rather than in police stations."' 84
However, as Professor Yale Kamisar notes in his pointed rebuttal to
Amar and Lettow's article, the judicial officer interrogation proposal is
riddled with flaws. First is the obvious unlikelihood that courts and/or
186legislatures would enact such a system of custodial interrogation.
reasonably may conclude that they have no regard for his rights or the laws
governing custodial interrogation. That conclusion may generate fear that any
refusal to comply with demands for answers may trigger lawless police
retaliation. The realization that the promise of Miranda is false will make the
police questioning more frightening and coercive.
Id. at 528-29.
180. Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MiCH. L. REV. 857 (1995).
181. Id. at 908-09.
182. Id. at 858-59, 898-901, 908-09, 926-27. Under this approach, a suspect would have
an unqualified right to remain silent only until he had an attorney present or was brought
in front of a judicial officer for the pretrial hearing; at this point, if the suspect decides to
continue to remain silent, his silence can be used against him at trial. Id. at 909. In
addition, under this approach the judicial officer could require the suspect to provide such
information under pain of being held in contempt of court if they fail to testify. Id. at 898.
183. Id. at 908-09.
184. Id. at 909.
185. Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and
Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 930-36 (1995).
186. Id. at 932-33. Indeed, as the Court has previously held:
What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is not the presence of
counsel . . . but rather, the presence of a judge [at trial] who does not (as an
inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead
decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties..
. . Our system of justice is, and has always been, an inquisitorial one at the
1224
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Second, this approach severely limits a suspect's complete right to remain
silent.187 Finally, this approach is ultimately not efficacious because a ban
on all stationhouse confessions would be an even more intrusive exercise
of judicial power than merely requiring Miranda warnings to be given
and excluding (even all) statements obtained without the benefits of
those warnings.
D. Civil Rights Actions: Another Incomplete Solution
In her article, Professor Susan R. Klein argues that the proper solution
to deliberate Miranda violations lays either in limiting Miranda'sS • 189
exceptions to unintentional violations, or in allowing suspects to bring a
civil rights action against police officers who intentionally violate a
suspect's Miranda rights during interrogation." Evaluating the efficacy
of these two options, Professor Klein argues that civil rights actions are
the best way to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination by deterring deliberate police misconduct during
interrogation.'9'
investigatory stage .... Even if detectives were to bring impartial magistrates
around with them to all interrogations, there would be no decision for the
impartial magistrate to umpire.
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991). Moreover, notwithstanding the obvious
bias that the notion of magistrates conducting interrogations would throw at the
fundamental nature of our adversarial system of justice, other more practical logistical
issues present themselves, such as the fact that such a proposal "'would be fully effective
only if an adequate supply of magistrates and defenders was provided on a 24-hours-a-day,
7-days-a-week basis."' Kamisar, supra note 185, at 933 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, The
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671,
714-15 (1968)).
187. Kamisar, supra note 185, at 934-35. First, under this approach, a suspect's right to
remain silent cannot be complete if he can nonetheless be held in contempt for refusing to
testify at pretrial hearing. Id. Moreover, if the suspect chooses to exercise this right to
remain silent and his case goes to trial, his silence can be used against him. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Klein, supra note 173, at 1354. This is, of course, the option advocated by
Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2615-16 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), a position that was rejected by both the
plurality, id. at 2612 n.6 (plurality opinion), and the dissent, id. at 2617 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting), in that case.
190. Klein, supra note 173, at 1354-55. It should be noted that civil rights actions are
also a solution proposed by Professor Weisselberg in his article In the Stationhouse After
Dickerson. Weisselberg, supra note 12, at 1158-63.
191. Klein, supra note 173, at 1355-56. Such civil rights actions would be brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001).
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While there has been some indication from the courts that civil rights
claims against officers for violations of Miranda are cognizable,'9 the civil
rights action approach has noticeable flaws.'93 First, courts have been
reluctant to find civil rights actions based solely on failure to administer
Miranda warnings during interrogation.194 Instead, courts have only
considered such actions in situations where police compelled a
defendant's statements and subsequently used the statements against the
defendant at trial.1 9 In dealing with these coercion cases, courts have
had to refer to the Due Process voluntariness test to evaluate the claim,
which is the very thing the Court hoped to move away from by instituting
Miranda in the first place. 9
Secondly, as Professor Weisselberg (a backer of civil rights actions as a
possible solution to this problem) notes, "it is difficult to conclude that
the risk of civil rights liability .. .can alone transform interrogation
practices."' 97  Few suspects whose Miranda rights are deliberately
violated are likely to sue the police department.' 98 Moreover, there is
some question as to whether the individual police officer would be held
192. See, e.g., Cal. Criminal Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039,
1050 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by Nos. 97-56499, 97-56510, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3 (9th
Cir. Jan. 3, 2000).
193. See infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 763 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that a failure to read a suspect Miranda warnings is not a constitutional
violation for purposes of bringing a civil liability claim against the Government under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
195. See, e.g., id. at 769 (plurality opinion) (refusing to find a civil rights violation on
grounds that "mere coercion does not violate the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause
absent use of the compelled statements in a criminal case against the witness").
Notwithstanding the fact that the Miranda Court deemed any statements obtained without
the benefit of Miranda warnings to be presumptively coerced absent a showing by the
state of a "knowing[] and intelligent[]" waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966), the Court's post-Miranda decisions have significantly
diminished the effect of that holding and its tenets to the point where the bright-line
requirements protecting a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights created in Miranda have
been virtually discarded in favor of less rigid strictures, see discussion supra Part I.C. The
erosion of the "knowing and intelligent" requirement can also be seen in the context of
waiver of Miranda rights in North Carolina v. Butler. 441 U.S. 369, 374-76 (1979)
(rejecting the notion that a waiver of Miranda rights has to be expressly waived in order to
satisfy the "knowing and intelligent" requirement).
196. Weisselberg, supra note 12, at 1161 & n.211.
197. Id. at 1156.
198. Id. Two reasons for this, Professor Weisselberg states, are that: (1) given the
suspects' alleged criminal nature, few will be seen as sympathetic claimants in the eyes of
the jury; and (2) very little money damages are likely to be awarded even if a suspect wins
his claim. Id.
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personally liable in such a civil rights action, or whether the police
department would indemnify him from such liability.' 99
III. LOOKING BACK TO ACHIEVE FUTURE BALANCE
It is established in the Constitution that, warning or not, the right
against self-incrimination is inviolate, and may not be abridged.' °°
Miranda initially called for specific warnings to be provided to the
suspect in order to ensure that those rights were respected, 0' but
subsequent exceptions in the Court's case law have eroded the rule over
time.2O Still, as Dickerson points out, the fact that Miranda has
exceptions does not alter the fact that the warnings are deemed necessary
by the Court.0 3 Accordingly, statements obtained after a deliberate
failure to adhere to Miranda should not be used against the defendant
204
either at trial or for impeachment purposes.
A. Closing the Door on "Question-First" with Seibert
In Seibert, the Court provides an opportunity to close the door on the
practice of "question-first" tactics. By objecting to the use of pre-warned
confessions to bind the suspect into a statement during interrogation, the
Court showed its unwillingness to hold a defendant to his pre-warned
statements where doing so would effectively render the defendant's
constitutional rights moot.' ° And yet, it is important to note that the
Court recognizes this protection within the confines of interrogation.
206
Surely, then, the Court would object on the same (or similar) grounds to
using statements obtained by deliberate violations of Miranda against a
suspect at trial for impeachment. For, even in the words of Justice
Thomas (who, by his opinions, is clearly an outspoken critic of
199. Id. Professor Weisselberg sees civil rights actions under § 1983 as helping to alter
police training conduct by discouraging deliberate violations of Miranda out of fear of
defending repeated lawsuits. Id. However, even if civil rights actions affect police training
on an individual level, Professor Weisselberg notes that the true effectiveness of these
actions will not be realized until other, larger systemic changes in police culture take place.
Id.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
201. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
202. See discussion supra Part I.C.
203. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442-43 (2000).
204. While at first blush, this approach appears to be at odds with the Court's decision
in Harris, upon closer inspection, the proposal put forth in this Comment recognizes the
necessity of obtaining truthful testimony from the defendant at trial pursuant to Harris,
but asks courts to distinguish this case in light of the "fruits" doctrine espoused in Patane
and Tucker. See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.C.
205. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
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Miranda),2 0 7 the Fifth Amendment protection is, at the very least, "'a
fundamental trial right. '''28 To hold the defendant at trial to a statement
obtained in deliberate violation of Miranda hinders the defendant's
ability to mount a complete trial defense, which is a constitutional right if
ever there was one. 2"9  Echoing Justice Brennan's dissent in Harris,
allowing the defendant to be bound by statements obtained from him
before Miranda warnings are given would deprive the defendant of an
"unfettered" opportunity to decide whether or not to testify on his own
behalf at trial.210
B. Filling the Void: Harris Does Not Fit the Bill
Though conventional wisdom would say that a witness's statements
obtained by deliberate violations of Miranda would likely fall under the
Harris exception and be admissible for impeachment,"' the rule in Harris
and its progeny do not support such a contention." In Harris, while the
Court was concerned with not giving a defendant an opportunity to lie in
court by hiding behind a constitutional rule, the initial confession was
voluntarily given under no false pretenses.23 By contrast, the issue of
207. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) (plurality opinion) (holding
that a mere failure to administer Miranda warnings did not justify a civil rights claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444-65 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (expressing grave doubts about the efficacy of Miranda).
208. United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2628 (2004) (quoting Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 264 (1990))).
209. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. While the right to mount a complete defense has
been recognized widely by the Court in its holdings, this argument is poignantly made in
relation to a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights as shown in the Court's 1973 decision
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973) (citing Miranda as an example of the
fact that "[a] strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed to a
criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the greatest possible opportunity to
utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal trial").
210. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. See id. at 224; see also, e.g., People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998) (holding
that a defendant's statements were admissible for impeachment purposes even though he
had requested his attorney and was interrogated after such a request was made). But cf
Henry v. Kernan, 177 F.3d 1152, 1156-58 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding a statement inadmissible
for impeachment purposes in a habeas corpus hearing on the ground that, although no
physical coercion was present, the statement was nonetheless coerced psychologically),
amended by 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1999); People v. Neal, 72 P.3d 280, 282 (Cal. 2003)
(finding that statements obtained by deliberate withholding of recitation of Miranda rights
deemed inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment, because they were
determined to be involuntary based on the facts).
212. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
213. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224. Additionally, as the dissent in Harris pointed out, the
case the majority relied on was Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), which dealt
with the admissibility of testimony to impeach the defendant on matters collateral to the
1228
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admissibility of a defendant's statement by a deliberate violation of
Miranda hinges on the fact that the inculpatory statements, though
perhaps voluntary, are nonetheless given under circumstances that
present the suspect with a distorted view of his Fifth Amendment
214
rights.
Applying Harris to deliberate violations of Miranda would create a
situation where a defendant could essentially make statements that "can
and will be used against him" to impeach him later in the interrogation
without understanding that he has a legitimate choice to remain silent.2 5
Moreover, at trial, notwithstanding the legitimacy of the defendant's
alibi, the defendant's unwarned statement will still be used against him,
216
even if it is only for impeachment purposes. Thus, at trial, the weight
of the defendant's alibi versus the pre-warned statement would be
assessed by the jury.217 As a result, instead of having the Constitution
protect and uphold the defendant's right against self-incrimination, the
defendant's individual liberties rest in the hands of twelve individuals
who might not only use these potentially inculpatory, unwarned
statements against him for impeachment purposes, but also to ultimately
determine his guilt.218 The Framers of the Constitution could not have
charge, id. at 65, not to impeach the defendant's direct testimony on matters directly
related to the charge against him, see Harris, 401 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
214. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2610-11 (2004) (plurality opinion). The
Court explained:
[Tihe reason that question-first is catching on is as obvious as its manifest
purpose, which is to get a confession the suspect would not make if he
understood his rights at the outset; the sensible underlying assumption is that with
one confession in hand before the warnings, the interrogator can count on
getting its duplicate, with trifling additional trouble.
Id. (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). As previously discussed, the Court recognized
in Seibert that this "question-first" technique is designed to circumvent Miranda and,
accordingly, is employed not by mistake, but by design. Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
215. See id. at 2611 (plurality opinion).
216. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224.
217. See FED. R. EvID. 104(e).
218. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (recognizing that there
are situations in which a high risk exists that jurors will not follow the instructions given it
by a court with regard to consideration of evidence); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the
Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135,
135-36 (1989) (noting that "[t]he ability of a jury to use evidence admitted under the Rule
404(b) exception for a proper purpose, at least in intent cases, is highly questionable...").
A brief look at the Federal Rules of Evidence provides additional evidence to support the
notion that juries are ill-equipped to handle potentially damaging evidence, particularly
when faced with the task of using the evidence solely for the purpose of impeachment, as
opposed to determining guilt or innocence. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 ("[E]vidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
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possibly had in mind that an unknowledgeable and impressionable trier
of fact misusing the rules of evidence would serve as the final
constitutional safeguard of a suspect's right to avoid self-incrimination." 9
C. Patane Provides the Key
As the majority in Miranda recognized, it is important to achieve a
balance between the state's interest in prosecuting criminals and the
preservation of an individual's constitutional rights during
interrogation."" Combining the Court's holding in Patane, concerning
fruits of an interrogation, with the Court's rationale in Seibert, regarding
admissibility of confessional statements, provides such a balance in
dealing with deliberate Miranda violations.
221
Under the PatanelSeibert approach,2 2 upon taking a suspect into
custody, police officers must still give a suspect Miranda warnings.2 3
However, if an officer deliberately engages in either "question-first" or
"outside Miranda" tactics during a custodial interrogation, under the
Patane/Seibert approach, the suspect's statements would be inadmissible
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."); id. 403 advisory committee's
note ("In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice [or jury
confusion], consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack (thereof] of
a limiting instruction [to the jury]."); see also id. 105 ("When evidence which is admissible
as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another
purpose ... the court.. . shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly."); id. 105 advisory committee's note ("A close relationship exists between
[Rule 105] and Rule 403.").
219. By its own words, the Constitution demands more than this. See U.S. CONST. art.
V1, cl. 2 ("This Constitution. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby.").
220. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. This balance is important in order
to ensure that a defendant is not invalidly held to a statement obtained from him by a
deliberate circumvention of a constitutional right, and that the state may still effectively
serve the needs of justice. See supra notes 40-41.
221. See infra notes 223-35 and accompanying text. Implicit in the rationale of the
Patane decision is the fact that the fruits of an interrogation (be they testimonial or not)
are not as likely to be subject to the inherent pressures or issues of voluntariness in the
ways that confessions obtained within a custodial interrogation are likely to be. See
United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626-30 (2004). In Patane, the Court recognized,
as Elstad and Tucker acknowledged before it, see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306
(1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-46 & 445 n.19 (1974), that the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine did not apply to cases involving the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination, Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2629-30. Based on this holding, the Court
found that, although the defendant's statement could not be used against him, the fruits of
his statement could be used against him at trial. Id. at 2627-28. The Court justified the
admission of such fruits of an interrogation on the ground that there was no potential for
the defendant's "statements" to be used against him at trial. id. at 2630.
222. This new approach will be referred to as the PatanefSeibert approach.
223. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
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at trial for any purpose, including impeachment.2  Though the
statements would be completely inadmissible at trial, under the
PatanelSeibert approach police officers would still be able to use the
defendant's statements to lead them to other fruits (be they witnesses or
physical evidence), which, under Patane, would still be admissible at trial
solely for impeachment purposes. /i 221
Unlike other attempts at solving this problem, the PatanelSeibert
approach is a more complete solution because it more effectively deters
deliberate police misconduct during interrogation, and still upholds a
suspect's Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda originally sought to
protect. The threat of complete inadmissibility at trial of a suspect's
statements under the PatanelSeibert approach will create a deterrent to
law enforcement officers seeking to obtain "trial worthy" evidence by
deliberately violating Miranda.2"' In addition, law enforcement members
who do obtain confessions "outside Miranda" will have to spend their
time and effort investigating the veracity of the statements, and obtaining
the fruits of the confession to use at trial.229 The final deterrent effect of
224. While "question-first" and "outside Miranda" are the two types of deliberate
Miranda violations tackled within the context of this Comment, the PatanelSeibert
approach is not intended to be limited to policing these specific practices. Rather, the
Patane/Seibert approach is meant to apply to any other potential interrogation technique
that a police officer might be able to concoct to attempt to circumvent the Miranda
requirements set forth by the Court.
225. See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2627-28.
226. See discussion supra Part It.
227. See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text. Though, in some respects, this
solution may appear similar to the approach put forth by Professors Amar & Lettow, see
discussion supra Part II.C, the Patane/Seibert approach is far more advantageous. First,
the PatanelSeibert approach is firmly rooted in the Court's (admittedly somewhat
jumbled) Miranda jurisprudence. See discussion supra Parts I.B-D, III.C. Second,
because it keeps both the investigatory and interrogatory functions in the hands of the
police, the PatanelSeibert approach does not require a radical upheaval of the criminal
justice system as seen in the Amar-Lettow approach, which effectively prohibits
stationhouse interrogation by police officers. See discussion supra Part II.C.
228. In light of the Court's rationale in Hass, which stated that the threat of
inadmissibility of confessional statements during the prosecution's case-in-chief created a
sufficient deterrent effect on law enforcement officers from violating Miranda during
interrogation, see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975), it is reasonable to assume that
deeming an unwarned confession inadmissible during the case-in-chief and for
impeachment purposes (a more stringent restriction on admissibility than under Harris
and Hass) would have, at a minimum, the same deterrent effect, and would likely be even
more of a deterrent, see supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
229. Even applying Professor Clymer's cost-benefit analysis to the proposed system
under the PatanelSeibert approach, see discussion supra Part II.B, there seems to be little
question that the amount of time and effort police officers would have to expend in order
to obtain evidence admissible for the sole purpose of impeaching a defendant (should he
even decide to take the stand) would be enormous when compared to the ease of simply
informing the suspect of his rights under Miranda. The argument in favor of giving the
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the PatanelSeibert approach on police misconduct is that, even if the
fruits of the confession have been obtained, the prosecution may still
only use the fruits against the defendant for impeachment purposes
should he testify in a manner contradictory to his pre-warned
statement.2 O Likewise, because the prosecution may still use statements
from third parties and evidence obtained by the defendant's confession
against him (even if only for impeachment), a defendant continues to
have little incentive to "roll the dice" in court by attempting to perjure
himself.
T
Perhaps the ultimate benefit of the PatanelSeibert approach is that it
stays true to Miranda and its progeny. It is not meant to supersede any
of the previous decisions regarding impeachment. Elstad and Harris
would still control in situations where a police officer obtains statements
by an absent-minded, good faith failure to read Miranda warnings to the
suspect."' The Patane/Seibert approach, by comparison, serves to deter
the practice of deliberately questioning a suspect with the "outside
Miranda" or "question first" techniques.2 33  By eliminating these and
other suspect interrogation practices surrounding Miranda, the
PatanelSeibert approach ensures what the Miranda Court held nearly
forty years ago: in order to preserve a defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights during police interrogation, a police officer must notify the suspect
of his rights)34 Moreover, this approach helps maintain the sanctity of
Miranda warnings is bolstered even further when considered in light of the fact that, by
Justice Souter's own admission in Seibert, "giving the [Miranda] warnings and getting a
waiver [from the suspect] has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility" of
evidence obtained through stationhouse interrogation. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct.
2601, 2608 (2004) (plurality opinion). Given the fact that eighty percent of suspects waive
their Miranda rights once notified of them, the likelihood of obtaining admissible
statements for use both at trial and for impeachment purposes is incredibly high. See
Klein, supra note 173, at 1355-56; see also Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996). But cf Amar & Lettow, supra note 180,
at 922 n.286 (noting that "physical leads are often more important to law enforcement
than getting statements for use in court").
230. See supra note 229 (discussing Professor Clymer's cost-benefit analysis as applied
to situations under the PatanelSeibert approach); see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 224-26 (1971) (allowing admission of unwarned statements for impeachment
purposes, even though such statements were inadmissible as substantive evidence under
Miranda).
231. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
232. See discussion supra Parts I.C.1, I.C.3. Naturally, the Harris exception would also
apply to a factual situation in which good-faith, incomplete Miranda warnings were given.
See discussion supra Part I.C.1. It is worth noting, however, that the Patane/Seibert
approach would cover situations in which the Miranda warnings were given in a
deliberately incomplete manner.
233. See supra note 224.
234. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). An added benefit to the
Patane/Seibert approach is that, since the suspect's inculpatory statements are not
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our accusatorial system of criminal justice by requiring "that the
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple
expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.
235
IV. CONCLUSION
The Miranda theory created a bright-line rule designed to protect the
rights of a suspect during police interrogation. Over time, however,
subsequent cases created exceptions to Miranda that diminished its
effectiveness and called into question its very constitutionality. As a
result of this uncertainty surrounding Miranda, a disturbing practice of
deliberate questioning "outside Miranda" has developed. Although the
Court has not dealt directly with the issue of whether the prosecution
may use statements obtained "outside Miranda" for impeachment
purposes, an approach based on the Court's holdings in the Seibert and
Patane cases provides an ideal solution to this issue.
admissible at court for any purpose, courts no longer have to use the cumbersome Due
Process voluntariness test to determine whether such statements were given voluntarily.
See supra note 221.
235. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
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